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PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION; CHANGE OF STATUS OF
THE PARTIES.
As a general rule a court of equity will not, by

preliminary injunction, change the status of the parties or restore
to one claimant property in the possession of another. In Pokegama Lumber Co. v. Klamath River Lumber &- I p. Co., 86 Fed.
528, the United States Circuit Court (Dist. of Cal.), the facts and
necessities of the case were decided to warrant the exercise of such
a jurisdiction. The respondents, on April 7, 1897, had leased to
one Lindley, to whose rights complainant succeeded, a large and
valuable lumbering plant, consisting of pine lands, logging railway
and equipments, rights of way, saw mill, etc. The railway was
about nine miles long and connected with a log chute by which the
logs were discharged into the Klamath River some twenty-four
miles above the mill. By the February following nearly 15,000,ooo feet of logs had been cut, the greater part of which were either
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near the railway or alongside of it ready to be loaded; about
4,500,000 feet were in the river and i,ooo,ooo feet were in the
booms connected with the mill. In preparing the logs and equiping various portions of the plant the complainant had spent more
than $70,000. The bill avered that complainant was in complete
readiness for the sawing season which had then begun when the
respondent, by its president, two of its directors and agents had
violently entered the mill during the night and driven out the night
watchman and blocked -up -the mill.so as to -prevent the use of it,
or the taking of logs from the boom, and with six or eight men
armed with rifles and shot guns held possession thereof and excluded
complainant and his agents. No notice had previously been given
by the respondents to the complainant of its failure to perform any
of the conditions of the lease nor had any attempt been made to
secure peaceful possession of the property. The bill declared that
the season for floating logs down the river would be shorter than
usual and would expire about June 1st; that logs already cut and
not hauled to the mill in the then logging season would depreciate
fifty per cent., and if not secured within the season following would
be a total loss ; that the said saw mill was the only available one to
which logs could be delivered and that respondent was wholly
insolvent and unable to respond to damages. Upon the filing of
the bill an order was issued requiring the respondent to show cause
why an injunction pentente life should not be granted, and upon the
complainant giving a bond the respondent, its officers, attorneys,
agents and servants were restrained in the meantime from in any
manner interfering with or impeding the complainant, its attorneys,
agents or employes in occupying, conducting, managing or carrying
on all the property mentioned in the lease.
It was contended that the injunction, although preventative in
in form, was mandatory in its effect, its execution resulting in a
change in the status of the parties, and that the court had no right
to issue such an order, except at the hearing of the cause. After
reviewing the facts, however, the court said that it was clear that
the asserted right to possession which respondent sought to maintain could not be recognized as anything more than a mere trespass
and interruption of the prior possession of the complainant.
Among other authorities the court quotes with approval MWining Co.
v. Mater Co., i Sawy. 685; High on Inj., § 356 ; Beech on Inj.,
§ 1392; Bisp. Eq., § 40o, and 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1359. The
latter author observes that preliminary mandatory injunctions have
been granted more freely by the English courts than the American,
and that it has been said in some American decisions that they
should never be granted.
While it is admittedly the purpose of a temporary injunction to
preserve the property in controversy from disturbance until the
rights of the contesting parties can be fully considered, yet if such
redress may only be prohibitive the very injury which it is sought
to prevent would be upheld. In such cases, in the absence of other
adequ te remedy, the court will require that the property be re-
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stored to the status immediately preceding the commencement of
the injury. The right, however, should be clear and certain, and
the injury must be of a character which I" upon just and equitable
As is said by Mr. Bispham, in
grounds ought to be prevented."
his book on equity, "There would seem to be no good reason
why, in a proper case, a mandatory injunction should not issue
upon preliminary hearing. Gross violations of right may occur in
the shortest possible time, and a few hours of wrong doing may
result in the creation of an intolerable injury which, if prolonged,
might soon become irreparable. In such cases the interposition of
the strong arm of the Chancellor ought to be most swift; and if
immediate relief could not, in a proper case, be restorative as well
as prohibitory, no adequate redress would, in many cases, be given."
The facts presented should also show that the plaintiff has acted
promptly upon his knowledge of the defendant's proceeding.
One of the earliest cases in which the remedy was allowed was,
Lane v. Vewdigate, io Ves. 192; where a preliminary injunction
was granted restraining the defendant from impeding the plaintiff
in the navigation of a canal "by continuing to keep the canal
banks and works out of repair, by diverting the water or by conLord Eldon stated that the
tinuing the removal of the stop-gate."
intended effect of the order was to compel the defendanit to restore
the stop-gate and repair the banks.
In Lacassange v. Chapuys, 144 U. S. 119, 124, Mr. Justice
Blatchford said, "The function of an injunction is to afford preventative relief, not to redress wrongs which have been committed
already. An injunction will not be used to take property out of
The
the possession of one party and put into that bf another."
facts of that case, however, were as clearly not within the scope of
the requirements for equitable relief as the facts of the California
case were within the scope of such requirements. In view of the
decision reported in x66 U. S. 548, Exjparte Lennon, it is not
believed that the United States Supreme Court intended to commit
itself to such a doctrine. In the latter case it was objected that
the preliminary order was mandatory and therefore invalid, but
Mr. Justice Brown said that a court of equity was not always
limited to the restraint of a contemplated or threatened action, but.
may even require affirmative action, where the circumstances of
the case demand it, and cited authorities in which the rule was
unquestionably applied. The case of fining Co. v. Water Co.,
i Sawy. 685 (Judge Field), also distinctly upholds the right of a
chancery court to take such a course where proper facts are presented.
NEGLIGENCE; EVIDENCE;

"1REs IPSA LoQUITUR; "

ELECTRIC

An excellent illustration of the enlargement of the doctrine
of res i2sa loquitur to suit the conditions of modern times is to be
found in the case of Snyder v. Wzeefing Electric Co., 28 S. E. 733
(1898), decided by the Supreme Court of West Virginia. The
defendant corporation, being engaged in the manufacture and sale
WIRES.
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of electricity, maintained wires over the streets of Wheeling. One
of these wires became broken and fell in the street, and plaintiff's.
intestate, having stepped upon it, was killed. Although no further
evidence of negligence on the part of defendant was produced,
judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, which was sustained
on appeal.
The case decides that the mere fact that a heavily charged wire
falls into a street, causing injury, raises a presumption of negligence,
on the part of the owner of the wire, which he must meet by
satisfactory evidence of care in the erection and maintenance of the
wire, etc. It is but an application of the rule of law expressed by
Messrs. Shearman and Redfield in their work on Negligence, 5 th
Ed. § 59, that, "when a thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
See Scott v. London ]Dock CO., 3 H. & C.
from want of care."
596 (1865); Se'boldv. A. Y &Z'. R. R., 95 N. Y. 562 (1884);
forris v. Strobel2uttle v. Chicago R. R., 48 Iowa, 236 (878);
l/lkin Co., 81 Hun. 1 (1894).
Although the doctrine of res 0isa loquitur is most frequently
applied when there is a contract relation between the parties, such
as that of passenger and carrier, yet that relation is not the only
one which may lead to its existence. The more correct view is
that the presumption of negligence arises wherever there is some
duO, such as that of care, owing by defendant toward plaintiff..
"Though the presumption is more frequently applied in such cases
(those of contract relation), yet there is no foundation in authority
or reason for such limitation, as the presumption originates from
the nature of the act, not from the relation of the parties, and is
indulged whenever, as a legitimate inference, the occurrence is such
as, in the ordinary course of things, does not take place when proper
Snyder v. Electric Co., .sipra. This
care has been applied."
proposition does not seem to be accepted by the Supreme Court of
of Pennsylvania in a case cited below.
That public policy requires the very highest degree of care to be
exercised by those who maintain electric currents of high tension
over the highways is established by abundant authority: W. U.
Tel. Co. v. State, 33 Atl. (Md.) 763 (894); Haynes v. Gas Co.,.
14 N. C. 203 (894) ; Girandi v. lvnprovenzent Co., 107 Cal.
120 (1895) ; Ennis v. Gray, 87 Hun. 355 (1895) ; Ark. Tel. Co..
v. Rutleree, 57 Ark. 429 (1893); Vat. Tel. Co. v. Baker, 2 Ch.
186 (893); 2 Jaggard, forts, 864. Therefore it follows, naturally,.
that when a wire breaks and the current injures a person lawfully
on the highway, a sufficient relation between the parties is shown
to justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, as in the following
cases: Denver Electric CO. v. Sinpson, 21 Co1. 371 (1895) ;
Larson v. Rwy., 56 Ill. App. 263 (1894) ; Volkmar v. El. Rwr.,
13 4 N. Y. 4 8 (18 9 2); Thomas v. W. U. Tel. Co., Ioo Mass..
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156 (1868); Agia v. Rwy., 16o Mass. 351 (1894); S;"Jerv.
Elertric Co., supra.
There is one case directly opposed to the above, Kefizer v. 2"raclion Co., 183 Pa. 24 (1897).
There the plaintiff was injured
through the fright of his horse at the sparks emitted from a suddenly
broken trolley wire. Although it was admitted that the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury was the breaking of the wire, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that there was no presumption of
negligence on the part of the company, and likened the case to
that of Gingst v. Rwy., 167 Pa. 438 (1895), where plaintiff was
injured by her horse taking fright at the rapid approach of an electric
car. It is submitted that the cases were not at all parallel, and
that different rules of evidence should be applied to each, since in
modern times traction companies are not bound to presume that
the mere approach of their cars will cause horses to run away. A more
reasonable statement of the rule to be applied in the case of broken
wires is given by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, as follows,
"Proof that there was a live wire, carrying a deadly current, down
in the highway surely raised a presumption that some one had failed
to do his duty to the public. When to this was added proof that
the death carrying wire was put above the street by the defendant,
and was its property, and under the management and control of its
servants, and that by contact with that wire the deceased, having a
right to be on the street, was killed, a complete priina facie case of
negligence was made out, and the burden was cast on defendant to
show that this live wire was in the street through no fault of its
servants and agents: " Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N. C. 203
(1894)CARRIERS; CONNECTING LINES; LIABILITY OF FIRST CARRIER
SELLING THROUGH TICKETS. In Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Crow,

74 N. W. io66 (Apr. 21, 1898), the Supreme Court of Nebraska
had to deal with the oft recurring question as to the liability of a
carrier who sells tickets over connecting lines for injuries received
by the passenger after having left the line of the first carrier. It
was there held that the contract of carriage was a through contract,
and the initial carrier was liable for the negligence of a connecting
carrier through whose agency the contract for through transportation was being performed. There was no stipulation on the ticket to
the effect that the selling carrier would be responsible for injuries
occuring on its own line only. Such a condition is now usually
attached to coupon tickets issued over several lines of railroad, and
questions can very seldom arise regarding the liability of the various
carriers, as such a stipulation would limit the liability of the first
carrier: Bethea v. R. R., i S. E. (S. Car.) 372 (1887) ; Harris
v. Howe, 12 S. W. (Tex.) 224 (1889); Xerigan v. R. R., 22
Pac. (Cal.) 677 (189o) ; S. C. 81 Cal. 248; Peterson v. R. R.,
45 N. W. (Iowa) 573 (1890); Gulf, Etc., _Ry. Co. v. Looney, 19
S. W. (Tex.) 1039 (1892).
Although a carrier is not by law bound to carry passengers
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beyond its own line, yet it may contract to do so, and in such a
case it would be liable for the completion of the contract: S. TV.
Ry. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 987 (1862); Birket v. RY., 4 H. & N.
730 (1859); Buxton v. .Ry. L. R., 3 Q_ B. 549 (1867); Thomas
v. Ry., L. R. 6 Q. B. 266 (870); Steller v. Ry., 49 Wis. 609
(188o); Ry. v. Peyton, io6 Ill. 534 (1883). But whetherthe mere
sale of a through ticket over connecting lines is sufficient to make
the contract one for through carriage, is decided differently in
different jurisdictions. The rule in England and some of the states
is that the first carrier is liable: Myt/on v. Ry., 4 H. & N. 615
(1859) ; .Ry. v. Blake, supra; Ry. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194
(1856); Kentv. Ry., L. R. io Q. B. I (1874); Croftv. -R. R.,
i McArthur (U. S.), 492 (1874); -Ry. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 337
(i86o) ; Afajac v. Ry., 7 Allen (Mass.), 329 (1863); Wilson v.
2. R., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 654 (1872) ; Weed v. R. R., 19 Wend.
(N. Y.) 534 (1838); Candee v. R. R., 21 Wis. 582 (1867);
Carterv. Peck, 4 Sneed. (Tenn.) 203 (x856) ; R. R. v. Combs,
70 Ga. 533 (1883).
But the doctrine which seems to be founded
more in reason is that the first carrier is not liable in the absence
of contract making it liable, and the mere sale of a ticket does not
constitute such a contract : R. R. v. Connell, 112 Ill. 295 (i884);
Knight v. R. R?., 56 Me. 235 (1868); .Furstenhein v. Ry., 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 238 (1872); Afosher v. Ry., 127 U. S. 390
(188o); Hoodv. R. R?., 22 Conn. 1 (1852); Young v. R. R.,
115 Pa. 112 (1886); Hartan v. Ry., 114 Mass. 44 (1873);
Spr.guev. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 (1854); Kesslerv. R.R., 61 N. Y.
538 (1875) ; Lundr v. Ry., 66 Cal. 191 (1884) ; Ry. v. Cavmpbell,
36 Ohio, 647 (i881).
CORPORATIONS; KNOWLEDGE OF ENTRIES IN CORPORATE BOOKS.
The interesting question of how far a corporation can be held to
know what is in its own books received discussion in Shepherd &'
Morse Lumber Co. v. Eldridge (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts), V1 N. E. 9, Bartlett, J. Plaintiff's employe had forged
its indorsements on certain checks and had collected the same from
the drawee. This action was against the drawer, who contended
that plaintiff was guilty of laches in not sooner giving information
of the forgery, notice of which it had had long since, either
"imputed"
from the knowledge of its dishonest employe, or
actual, the facts showing the crime being evident in plaintiffs
books of account, so as to have been discovered if an honest clerk
had made the monthly trial balances, or if the treasurer of the company who had access to the books, had examined them. The court
held that there was no "imputation of knowledge," and no duty on
plaintiff's part to any one connected with the checks, requiring examination of its books of account, or the making of trial balances, and so
"it is not to be chargeable with knowledge which it did not in fact
have."
This lack of any duty to a third person distinguishes the
case, says the court, from Dana v. Bank of the Republic, 132 Mass.
i56 (1882). The discussion amounts only to dictum, as the plaintiff
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was found guilty of negligence on other grounds, but is noteworthy
as touching a nice point. There are cases making a distinction
between the knowledge of an employe of his own criminal act, of
course beyond the scope of his employment, and the knowledge
the same employe may have from books or documents, even those
kept or executed by himself. In the latter case, an honest employe
would have discovered the fraud, and under these circumstances
some courts have charged the employer as though the knowledge
were his. In Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & Keen, 699, 722 (1834),
plaintiff filed a bill to set aside a certain assignment of mortgage
which her solicitor had induced her to make, telling her it was
some other paper. This solicitor afterwards assigned his interest
to defendant for value, acting as defendant's solicitor in the transaction. While defendant was not charged with the solicitor's
knowledge of his own original fraud, he was charged with
knowledge of whatever appeared on the face of the deed,
sufficient to have led an honest solicitor (though not a layman)
to discover the fraud. See, also, August v. Bank, i N. Y.
Suppl. I39 (1888); Bank v. Allen, xoo Ala. 476 (z893).
The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also recently considered this
same question: United Securio Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 185
Pa. 586, S. C., 42 W. N. C. 586. The referee's report, on similar
facts to those above, held, " Of these entries . . . the plaintiff
(corporation) must be taken to have had knowledge. .
. The
knowledge of the entries possessed by Williams was knowledge obtained by him in the course of his agency. He was the person
trusted by the corporation to know the contents of its own books.
If he knew it and wrongfully concealed it, it does not relieve the
plaintiff from the consequences of actual knowledge."
This report
was confirmed but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that "no agent who is acting in his own antagonistic interest,
or has committed a fraud by which his principal is effected, can be
presumed to have disclosed (italics ours) such fraud."
The court's
argument goes on the argument of "imputation of knowledge,"
which is by some considered an exploded fiction. The referee's
report might have been affirmed on the rule that, between two
equally innocent parties, he should suffer whose servant has committed the wrong; or on the doctrine applying with especial force
in the case of a corporation, that the fund of the principal, which
the agent is working to increase, should bear the loss due to the
agent's acts in the scope of his employment. The posting and
examination of the books was certainly an act in the scope of
employment. To inquire whether, under the circumstances, the
agent "can be presumed to have disclosed" the entries as a matter
of reality, which is what is done when the item of "antagonistic
interest" is brought in, is, to quote an expression of Mr. Keener,
" treating a fiction as though it were a fact."
The question should
not be "Is the presumption in favor of actual communication by
the agent?" but "On the facts is it just that the corporation bear
the responsibility as though communication had been made?"
But the authorities seem to have closed the particular question as to
book entries.

